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Dispositional Pluralism 
JENNIFER McKITRICK 
In this paper, I make the case for the view that there are many different kinds 
of dispositions, a view I call dispositional pluralism. The reason I think that 
this case needs to be made is to temper the tendency to make sweeping gen-
eralization about the nature of dispositions that go beyond conceptual truths. 
Examples of such generalizations include claims that all dispositions are in-
trinsic, essential, fundamental, or natural.! In order to counter this tendency, I 
will start by noting the extent to which it is at odds with the semantics of 
dispositions, according to which there are many kinds of disposition ascrip-
tions. From there, I will try to support a metaphysical claim that there are 
different kinds of dispositions. To bridge the gap between semantics and 
metaphysics, I appeal to epistemology. I'll consider the question "when do we 
have good reason to believe that a disposition ascription is true?" If our dis-
position ascriptions are true, then we are right about what kinds of disposi-
tions things have, and what kinds of dispositions there are. I claim that our 
evidence for different kinds of dispositions is on a par; we have reason to 
believe that various kinds of dispositions are instantiated. 
There might be good reasons to want to distinguish between different 
kinds of dispositions. One might want to focus on the intrinsic dispositions, 
or the fundamental dispositions. One might want to go further and say that 
other properties aren't really dispositions at all. However, the question "which 
are the real dispositions?" becomes a terminological issue. One can decide not 
to call certain properties "dispositions," even when they otherwise seem like 
dispositions, because they fail to satisfy certain conditions. This might be a 
harmless terminological decision. However, I think it is preferable to keep the 
concept "disposition" closer to its ordinary English usage as a more general 
concept. 
Defending dispositional pluralism involves arguing against extremist or 
absolutist positions about dispositions - views according to which all disposi-
tions are necessarily this or that. Debates about dispositions are often pre-
sented as dichotomies between two extremes.2 These dichotomies include 
intrinsic versus extrinsic, grounded versus ungrounded, reducible versus irre-
For example Ellis 2002; Molnar 2002; Heil 2005. 
2 For example, see Ellis 2002, 59-60. 
Published in DEBATING DISPOSITIONS: ISSUES IN METAPHYSICS, EPISTEMOLOGY AND  
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, ed. Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf, and Karsten R. Stüber (Berlin &  
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), pp. 186-203. Copyright (c) 2009 Walter de Gruyter. Used by permission.
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ducible, fundamental versus derivative, essential versus non-essential, first-
order versus higher-order, natural versus unnatural, causally inert versus caus-
ally efficacious, and non-existent versus universal. However, there's room in 
logical space for mixed or moderate positions along each of these dimensions. 
1. Dispositions Talk 
A number of English words are roughly synonymous with "disposition": 
tendency, power, force, predisposition, liability, susceptibility, propensity, 
potentiality, proclivity, inclination, ability, capability, faculty, and aptitude. 
There are different connotations and shades of meaning, between, for exam-
ple, a power to act and a liability to be acted upon. Some terms, such as "pro-
clivity" suggest rational agency, while others such as "force" suggest funda-
mental properties of matter. 
Many terms in English are dispositional. They cover a broad range of 
qualities, from fragility to courage. They include: terms from various branches 
of science, such as charge, energy, reactivity, conductivity, malleability, solu-
bility, elasticity, fitness, and fertility; character traits, such as integrity, or being 
punctual, neat, kind, considerate, and shy; common qualities of physical ob-
jects, such as being elastic, comfortable, flammable, intoxicating, or hazard-
ous; and complex social concepts, such as marketable, redeemable, tax-
deductible, collectible, humorous, provocative, titillating, recognizable, and 
enviable. Obviously, dispositional terms are quite diverse. 
At this point, the reader may wonder, on what grounds do I classify these 
terms as dispositional? I suggest that a term is dispositional if it has the fol-
lowing marks of dispositionality: 
1. The term is associated with an event type - the manifestation of the 
disposition; 
2. The term is associated with an event type in which the manifestation 
occurs - the circumstances of manifestation; 
3. The term is ascribable to an object when the manifestation is absent; 
4. If a dispositional term is ascribable to an object, then a certain sub-
junctive conditional to the effect that "if the circumstances of mani-
festation were to occur, then the manifestation would occur" is true; 
5. The term is semantically equivalent to an overtly dispositional locu-
tion - "the disposition to so and so.,,3 
I offer these marks of dispositionality as rules of thumb, not as an analysis. 
They do strike me as jointly sufficient, since I cannot imagine a term bearing 
all five marks and yet failing to be a disposition term. However, I hesitate to 
3 This is an adaptation of the marks of dispositionality for properties (McKitrick 2003, 156-158). 
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assert that each is necessary. Counter-examples to conditional analyses sug-
gest that the fourth mark is not always true of disposition terms. The carefully 
packed glass is still fragile, but the counterfactual "if it were struck, it would 
break" is not true of it.4 Also, if there are some disposition terms which are 
not applicable in the absence of the associated manifestations, then the neces-
sity of the third mark is called into question as well. For example, we call a 
structure "stable" as long as it stays intact. When the structure falls down, it 
no longer manifests stability, nor is it stable. If "stability" is a disposition 
term, it is one that is not attributable in the absence of its manifestation. But 
putting aside odd exceptions, a wide variety of terms bear these marks of 
dispositionality. 
2. Philosophical Distinctions 
Philosophers have made a number of philosophical distinctions between 
different kinds of dispositions. Aristotle makes a distinction between rational 
and non-rational capacities. Non-rational dispositions of objects, including 
human bodies, manifest in circumstances of manifestation due to physical 
necessity. Examples of non-rational dispositions include the disposition of a 
rock to fall, and the disposition of human skin to tan in sunlight. Rational 
dispositions, on the other hand, are dispositions of rational agents to perform 
certain actions if they so choose, such as playing a musical instrument, or 
speaking a language.5 
Ryle distinguishes single-track or specific dispositions on the one hand 
from multi-track or generic (general) dispositions on the other.6 Some dispo-
sitions are triggered in just one kind of circumstance and manifest themselves 
in only one way. For example, the only manifestation of solubility is dissolv-
ing, and being immersed in liquid is its only circumstances of manifestation. 
Perhaps there are some differences between particular immersions or dissolv-
ings, but they must be similar enough to all count as the same kinds of events. 
However, other dispositions, such as bravery, have different kinds of manifes-
tations which occur in different kinds of circumstances. Various circum-
stances, such as fires, battles, amusement park rides, medical procedures, and 
intimidating social situations can trigger acts of bravery. The manifestations 
are as diverse as rushing into a burning building, or taking an unpopular po-
4 For a discussion of counterexamples to conditional analyses of dispositions, see Smith 1977, 
Johnston 1992, Martin 1994; Bird 1998. 
5 See Ludger Jansen in the volume for more on Aristode's many distinctions among dispositional 
. properties and the like. 
6 Ryle 1949, 118. 
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litical stand. Perhaps the circumstances and manifestations can be given a 
unifying abstract characterization such as fear-inducing situations which in-
volve danger or substantial personal risk and confronting that fear or danger. 
However, the types of events that count as manifestations and circumstances 
of manifestation of multi-track dispositions are diverse and only count as the 
same kind of event at some very high level of abstraction. 
C. D. Broad distinguishes hierarchies of dispositions, of first, second, or 
higher order'? A higher-order disposition is a disposition to acquire or lose a 
disposition. Magnetizability is a higher-order disposition, on Broad's termi-
nology. Some pieces of metal are magnetic - are disposed to attract or repel 
other metals and magnets. However, other pieces of metal aren't magnetic, 
but can become magnetic if they are subject to a strong enough magnetic 
field. These non-magnetic metal pieces are thus magnetizable. They have a 
second-order disposition - the disposition to acquire the disposition of being 
magnetic. 
Rom Harre, following Aristotle and Locke, distinguishes powers and li-
abilities, also known as active powers and passive powers.8 If something has 
power to A, it will do A in certain circumstances. On the other hand, if some-
thing has a liability, it has a disposition to suffer change. In the case of liabili-
ties, the thing that changes is the disposed object, and situation that produces 
change is external to the object. Fragility is supposed to be a liability. The 
fragile thing is subject to an external force and changes internally. External 
circumstances, such as the strike of a hammer, trigger the manifestation. Poi-
sonousness, on the other hand, is supposed to be a power. When someone is 
poisoned, the cause of poisoning is in the disposed object - the poison. The 
locus of manifestation is not in the disposed object, but external to it. The 
poison has an effect on something else, and the manifestation is that some-
thing else changing. 
One may argue that this distinction does not hold up to scrutiny as meta-
physical, but is merely pragmatic. The manifestations of dispositions have 
multiple causal factors. Whether the salient causes are internal or external to 
the disposed object is determined by the relevant interests and background 
assumptions. In the example above, the solidity of the striking hammer is 
considered to be causally relevant to the shattering, but the fragility of the 
glass isn't. But it's not clear on what grounds we make that distinction. Con-
sider explosiveness, which intuitively seems like a power. But the manifesta-
tion of explosiveness is the explosion, which typically destroys the explosive 
object. The cause of the explosion has to do with the nature of the bomb, but 
also with being ignited - a cause external to the bomb itself. When explosive-
7 Broad 1925,432. 
8 Harre 1970, 84; Aristotle 1941; Locke 1990, 105-107. 
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ness is manifest, the bomb ends up in little scattered pieces as a result of an 
external cause. Structurally, that sounds a lot like fragility, which was sup-
posed to be a liability. One may argue that, in the case of explosiveness, 
things external to the bomb are affected as well. However, this doesn't clearly 
distinguish it from fragility, since things external to the struck glass may be 
affected when its shards go flying. 
Despite the suspicion that the active/passive distinction is merely prag-
matic, perhaps other distinctions are more robust. Philosophers often distin-
guish sure-fire or deterministic dispositions on the one hand, and tendencies 
or probabilistic dispositions on the other. In the case of a sure-fire disposi-
tion, when the disposed object is in the circumstances of manifestation, the 
occurrence of the manifestation is physically necessary or exceptionless. In 
the case of tendencies, when the disposed object is in the circumstances of 
manifestation, the manifestation might occur, but it might not. Examples of 
probabilistic dispositions include the disposition of enriched uranium to de-
cay and probably most behavioral dispositions. A sociable person typically 
engages in conversation but may neglect to on occasion. One might want to 
say that a thing has a probabilistic disposition if it manifests that disposition 
in the circumstances most of the time. However, something may be a ten-
dency even if it doesn't usually happen in the circumstances of manifestation. 
The recovering alcoholic has a tendency to drink, but resists it.9 
So, a disposition is probabilistic if there are occasions, or even if it is 
merely possible that the disposed object is in the circumstances of manifesta-
tion and yet the manifestation does not occur. However, if that were all that it 
took for a disposition to be a tendency, then it is not clear whether there 
would be there any sure-fIre dispositions. Many counterexamples to condi-
tional analyses consist of imagining a possible scenario in which a disposed 
object is the circumstances of manifestation yet fails to manifest the disposi-
tion. They seem to show that virtually all dispositions are such that, if objects 
which instantiate them are placed in the circumstances of manifestation, it's 
possible that the manifestation does not occur. This is because the disposition 
might be masked, an antidote to the disposition might be delivered, or the 
disposition might be fInkish.lO 
However, there still seems to be a difference between probabilistic and 
sure-fire dispositions even if we can't perfectly articulate it. Perhaps a sure-fIre 
disposition is such that, if the disposed object were in the circumstances of 
manifestation under ideal conditions, the manifestation would necessarily 
occur, while the probabilistic disposition is such that, even if the disposed 
object were in the circumstances of manifestation under ideal conditions, the 
9 See Jansen on tendencies (2006). 
10 See Johnston 1992; Martin 1994; Bird 1998. 
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manifestation only has a certain probability of occurring. Even if there is no 
funny business such as masks or finks, the manifestation of a probabilistic 
disposition might not occur in the circumstances of manifestation. Perhaps 
we cannot specify a way to determine if we are dealing with a probabilistic 
disposition or a thwarted deterministic disposition, but that's the conceptual 
distinction at least. 
3. Semantic Support for Pluralism 
Because philosophers have distinguished so many different dispositional con-
cepts, and the terms that bear the marks dispositionality are so diverse, dispo-
sitional semantics does not support absolutist claims. Dispositional terms 
attribute a wide variety of kinds of properties to objects: intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties, reducible and irreducible properties, essential and non-essential 
properties, natural and unnatural properties, and so on. Absolutist claims do 
not fall out of an analysis of the concept of a disposition, nor do they follow 
from particular dispositional concepts, such as fragility. 
Probably the most sweeping absolutist claims about dispositions are that 
they are non-existent, or on the other extreme, that they are universal. In 
other words, either all properties are dispositions, or all properties are non-
dispositional. However, it seems clear that some terms bear marks of disposi-
tionality and others do not. Even absolutists who say there are no dispositions 
and others who say that all properties are dispositions acknowledge a distinc-
tion between dispositional and non-dispositional predicates.11 
A commonly made generalization about dispositions is that they are all 
intrinsic properties. One could also claim that they are all extrinsic properties, 
a view that Brian Ellis attributes to Humeans.12 Dispositions might appear to 
be extrinsic if what dispositions a thing has depends upon the prevailing laws 
of nature. Another reason one might have for thinking dispositions are ex-
trinsic is that they are relations an object has to possible events - the manifes-
tations. However, if the third mark of dispositionality obtains even some-
times, then it is possible for a thing to have a disposition and not exhibit its 
manifestation. If the particular manifestation event does not occur, and dy-
adic relations require the existence of both relata, then the disposition cannot 
be a relation. The best way I can see of saving the idea that dispositions are 
relations and thus extrinsic is to make the hard case that there is a sense in 
11 For example see Armstrong 1973. 15; Shoemaker 1980, 211. However, others suggest that 
there's no clear way to demarcate a clispositional/ non-clispositional clistinction even at the con-
ceptuallevel (Mellor 1974, 171; Goodman 1983,41). 
12 Ellis 2002, 60. 
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which mere possibilia, such as merely possible events, exist.13 So, I will leave 
aside this reason for thinking that all dispositions are extrinsic. 
The idea that all dispositions are intrinsic, or that they are all extrinsic, has 
no semantic support either. Dispositional concepts would be concepts of 
intrinsic properties if they were necessarily equally applicable to perfect dupli-
cates. However, while some dispositional predicates are equally applicahle to 
perfect duplicates, others are not. For example, 'fragility' applies equally to 
perfect duplicates: One would be hard-pressed to justify calling one glass 
fragile but not its perfect duplicate. 'Vulnerability,' on the other hand, is a 
dispositional term that can apply differentially to perfect duplicates. For ex-
ample, a newborn infant left alone in the woods is more vulnerable than his 
perfect twin at home in his crib. 'Visibility' also differs in its applicability to 
perfect dublicates. While duplicate glasses are equally fragile, the glass that's 
hidden in a dark room is not visible, but its well-light, out-in-the-open dupli-
cate is. The applicability of the dispositional predicate is not merely a matter 
of the object being in the circumstances of manifestation of the disposition, 
but of it being in the circumstances of possession of the disposition.14 
Another dimension of absolutism concerns the natural/unnatural distinc-
tion. One might argue that all dispositions are natural properties, or, perhaps 
that all dispositions are unnatural properties. The primary reason for thinking 
that all dispositions are natural properties is the view that the only real prop-
erties, and hence the only real dispositions, are the natural ones. This view 
naturally goes along with the idea that not every predicate corresponds to a 
property.IS While I agree that some predicates, such as 'non-self-instantiating' 
do not correspond to any property, suffice it to say that dispositional plural-
ism fits best with a fairly liberal ontology of properties.16 But like the disputes 
about "real" dispositions, the dispute about the sparseness or abundance of 
properties might have a terminological interpretation as well. While the sparse 
property theorist distinguishes between the predicates that refer to properties 
and those that don't, the liberal property theorist allows that most predicates 
refer to properties, and distinguishes between natural and unnatural proper-
ties. The liberal property theorist need not have a bloated ontology if she can 
allow that unnatural properties are reducible to natural properties, or that 
property claims are true in virtue of actual features of particulars. In fact, the 
fundamental ontologies of the sparse and liberal theorists could be the same, 
and they differ only in what they choose to call a property. 
13 Rosenberg 2004, 211. 
14 See McKitrick 2003 for an extended defense of extrinsic dispositions. 
15 Annstrong 1996, 18. 
16 An example of a liberal, or abundant view of properties is that of David Lewis, according to 
which there is a property for every possible set of possibilia (1983). 
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To arrive at the opposite conclusion that dispositions are unnatural, one 
might reason as follows. A disposition is a secondary property (a property 
which consists in having some property or other) and is thus multiply realiz-
able. Multiply realizable properties can be shared by objects with different 
realizer properties, so they are equivalent to disjunctive properties, and dis-
junctive properties are unnatural. 17 
But once again, our linguistic practices do not support either extreme. 
Some dispositional predicates are applicable only to things that are similar to 
one another in some important way, while other dispositional predicates seem 
applicable to a diverse, gerrymandered group. For example, things which are 
'electrically conductive' probably have certain compositional and structural 
similarities. However, things which are 'provocative' form a diverse group 
with no relevant respect of intrinsic similarity. So, it seems that some disposi-
tional predicates seem to pick out natural properties, while others pick out 
unnatural properties. 
Dispositional essentialists claim that all dispositions are essential proper-
ties of the objects which instantiate them.t8 An object with a certain disposi-
tion cannot lose that disposition and still be the same object. A plausible 
example of a disposition which is essential to its possessor is the electrical 
charge of an electron. Arguably, a particle without the disposition to repel 
negatively charged particles could not be an electron. On Ellis' view, all genu-
ine dispositions are similarly definitive of the objects which instantiate them. 
On the opppsite extreme is the view that dispositions are non-essential prop-
erties. On such a view, an object could lose any Df its dispositions if, for ex-
ample, it were subject to different laws of nature. 
However, attributions of dispositional predicates follow not such stric-
tures. On the one hand, some disposition ascriptions seem contingent. The 
courageous person might have been otherwise, given a different upbringing. 
The fragile doll house could have been put together with a stronger adhesive. 
On the other hand, some disposition ascriptions seem necessarily true. In 
other words, there are some disposition predicates such as 'having negative 
charge' that apply to certain objects in every circumstance in which that ob-
ject exists. 
Furthermore, disposition ascriptions do not distinguish between 
grounded and ungrounded properties, reducible and irreducible properties, 
fundamental and derivative properties, or ftrst-order and higher-order proper-
ties. If I attribute a disposition to an object, learning that the disposition as-
cription was true in virtue of the fact that the object had some distinct prop-
erty would not give me a reason to withdraw my disposition attribution. For 
17 Lewis suggests this sort of picture (1986,224). 
18 Ellis 2002, 59. 
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example, suppose I claim that Joe is irritable. Then I'm told that Joe is irrita-
ble in virtue of some of his neurological features - his irritability derives from 
or is based on these neurological features. I withdraw neither my claim that 
Joe is irritable nor my belief that his irritability is a disposition. Even if my 
claim that Joe is irritable were reducible to a claim about some distinct prop-
erty, reduction is not elimination, and I have no reason to withdraw my dis-
position ascription. 
On the other hand, if I attribute a disposition to an object, learning that 
that object had no distinct property in virtue of which that claim was true 
would give me no reason to withdraw my claim. For example, suppose I claim 
that a massive object is disposed to attract other massive objects. If I learned 
that the object has no distinct property in virtue of which this is true, that this 
was a fundamental, irreducible feature of the object, I would not withdraw my 
disposition claim. So, there seem to be disposition terms that attribute deriva-
tive, grounded, and perhaps reducible properties to things, and others that 
could attribute fundamental, ungrounded, irreducible properties to things. 
The semantics are consistent with there being all of these kinds of disposi-
tions. 
Furthermore, whether any or all dispositions are causally inert or causally 
efficacious cannot be determined by examining language. The causal power, 
or lack-there-of, is not always part of the dispositional concept. (Notable 
exceptions are dispositional kin concepts such as 'power' and 'capability.,) 
Finding out that a property is causally inert or efficacious does not necessarily 
lead one to withdraw a disposition claim. When the doctor attributes a 'dor-
mitive virtue' to the sleeping pill, many seem convinced that he has not re-
vealed any causally efficacious property of the pill. If this is right, then some 
dispositional ascriptions are not attributions of causally efficacious properties. 
Could one consistently maintain that other disposition ascriptions do attribute 
causally efficacious properties? That depends on one's reasons for thinking 
that dormitivity is inert. Those reasons mayor may not apply to all disposi-
tion terms. For example, if you think that dormitivity is a second-order prop-
erty - a property of having some property or other that causes sleep upon 
ingestion, then you might think all the causal work is done by the lower-order 
property, and so the dormitivity is inert.19 However, that is consistent with 
there being some first-order dispositions that do not lose out in a causal ex-
clusion argument, and so they can be considered causally efficacious. 
To summarize what I have said so far, philosophers have distinguished 
several different disposition concepts. Natural language, English anyway, 
presents a wide variety of disposition terms and concepts. We can and do 
19 Such causal exclusion arguments are put forth by Kim 1993,353; Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 
1982,255. 
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attribute a variety of dispositional predicates: intrinsic and extrinsic, natural 
and unnatural, essential and non-essential, higher-order and fundamental. Our 
disposition ascriptions are neutral with respect to whether the dispositions are 
reducible or irreducible, bare or grounded, essential or non-essential, inert or 
efficacious. 
4. Beyond Conceptual Analysis? 
I've argued that we employ numerous and diverse dispositional concepts. 
What does that tell us about the world? I hope it is not too naive to think that 
a long entrenched tradition of employing certain concepts with apparent 
success gives some reason for thinking that those conceRts are related to the 
world in a meaningful way. I am supposing that, if our disposition ascriptions 
are true, "then the dispositions we ascribe to things exist, in whatever sense 
properties exist (as universals, tropes, natural kinds, genuine similarities, etc.). 
I am well aware that this assumption stands in opposition to a major project 
of the last century, to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions. If that pro-
ject were successful, one could say that disposition ascriptions are true, but 
not because dispositions exist, but because the ascriptions are merely ways of 
asserting something that is consistent with the non-existence of dispositions, 
such as a conditional, or a claim about non-dispositions. Just as the claim that 
"The average American woman has 1.5 children" doesn't commit one to the 
existence of the average American woman nor half-children, it is thought that 
claims such as "x has a disposition to so and so" doesn't commit one to the 
existence of dispositions. However, it is not easy to say what disposition as-
criptions mean if there are no dispositions.20 The denier of dispositions is in 
the uncomfortable position of either claiming that all of our numerous and 
varied disposition ascriptions are false, or explaining how they could be true if 
there are no dispositions: 
If we accept that the truth of disposition claims gives us evidence for the 
existence of dispositions, then we know that dispositions exist to the extent 
that we know that disposition ascriptions are true. So, what is our evidence 
for truth of disposition claims? Dispositions are not directly observable; how-
ever, their manifestations often are. Simply put, when we observe that an 
object regularly exhlbits a certain manifestation in certain circumstances, then 
we have reason to believe that the object has a disposition to exhibit that 
manifestation in those circumstances. We are also sometimes justified in be-
20 See Markus Schrenk's paper in the volume for a recap of the Wlhappy history of that project 
However, even some non-reductionist, such as George Molnar, reject the view that ascribable 
dispositional predicates correspond to genuine dispositions (Molnar 2003, 27). 
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lieving that an object has a disposition even if we have never observed that 
particular object manifesting that disposition. In that case, we have reason t{) 
believe that it is relevantly similar to objects which have regularly exhibited 
that manifestation in those circumstances. I think that something like this is 
all the reason we ever have for believing that something has a particular dis-
position. Of course, we are fallible, and we might over-generalize or misiden-
tify the relevant respect of similarity. The process is more detailed and con..: 
trolled in a scientific experiment, ADd of course, the case is much more 
.complicated when the manifestation is itself unobservable, such as the mani-
festation of an electron to .repc~l other electrons .. ('!be question of how to 
determine when unobservable manifestations occur is answered by however 
we determine .that any unobservable state of affairs obtains.) 
It seems to.me that the evideqce we have for different disposition claims 
does not discriminate between different kinds of dispositions. The evidence 
for the assertibility of our ascriptions. of different kinds of dispositions seems 
to be on a par. For example, though flammability may be a more natural 
property than provocativeness, our evidence that a red cape is provocative is 
not unlike our evidence that it is flammable: When it, or capes like it, are 
waved in front of a bull, the bull charges; when they are ignited, they burn. 
Favorable evidence is not exclusive to natural properties. 
In a similar vein, I could argue that we have evidence for dispositions on 
both sides. of each distinction. However, I'm going to concentrate on what 
strikes me as the hardest case - ungrounded or bare dispositions. Is the evi-
dence for bare dispositions on a par with our evidence for grounded disposi-
tions? One might think that, in the case of bare dispositions, even if an object 
has exhibited a certain manifestation in the past, since the disposition is not 
grounded in any other property of the object, the object might have mysteri-
ously lost the disposition in the mean time. 
However, if we are going to be that skeptical about the stability of dispo-
sitions, this skepticism would not single out bare dispositions as possibly 
fleeting. Suppose I pick up a rubber band, stretch it, then put it down. It re-
sumes its former shape, I figure that it has the disposition of elasticity, and I 
presume there's something about its structure and composition that accounts 
for this. But a minute later, if I want to adopt a skeptical attitude, for all I 
know, its underlying structure might have changed, and it's no longer elastic. 
In fact, it has happened that I opened my drawer and picked up a rubber 
band that appears to be the same as it did the last time I used it, but when I 
go to use it again, I find that it has lost its elasticity and has become brittle. Of 
course, this loss of elasticity takes much longer than a minute, and my prac-
tice of assuming that, other things being equal, things retain their dispositions, 
serves me pretty well. I don't see where the ground of the disposition, or lack-
Dispositional Pluralism 197 
there-of, makes a difference in my confidence that things retain their disposi-
tions when they are not manifesting them. 
What about when a particular instance of a bare disposition has never 
been manifest? How do we know it is there at all? As mentioned above, in 
general, when an object has never manifested a particular disposition, our 
evidence that it has that disposition is its similarity to other objects which we 
have observed to manifest that disposition. But in the case of bare disposi-
tions, one may argue, it's not clear what the relevant respect of similarity is. 
Since the disposition is bare, there is no observable property that objects 
share, which grounds the disposition in question. This suggests that our evi-
dence for unmanifested bare dispositions would be inferior to our evidence 
for unmanifested grounded dispositions. 
While this argument seems plausible, it assumes that our evidence for 
unmanifested grounded dispositions is the observation of a causal basis 
shared with manifested dispositions. However, this is unlikely. Consider your 
reasons for believing that something has an unmanifested grounded disposi-
tion, such as a tablet that is water-soluble. Your evidence for the tablet's wa-
ter-solubility is the observable properties it shares with things that have dis-
solved in the past. But the observable properties are unlikely to be the causal 
basis of the tablet's water-solubility. You do not observe a particular molecu-
lar structure, or anything that is a plausible candidate for being a causal basis 
of solubility. Similar points can be made about unmanifested elasticity, fragil-
ity, inflammability, etc. So, either we are not justified in believing such ascrip-
tions of unmanifested grounded dispositions, or the claim that we are only 
justified in believing an ascription of an unmanifested disposition when we 
observe its causal basis is false. 
I think we are justified in making ascriptions of unmanifested dispositions 
in the absence of any observation or knowledge of a causal basis. So, our 
evidence for dispositions which may happen to be bare is on a par with 
grounded dispositions. That is not to give evidence for the bareness of those 
dispositions. For that, we have the (defeasible) evidence that the property in 
question is fundamental.21 
5. Property Dualism 
Dispositional pluralism, the view that there are many different kinds of dispo-
sitions, is obviously inconsistent with the denying that dispositions exist. An 
absolutist who claims that all properties are non-dispositional is unlikely to be 
convinced by my claims that we have evidence for the truth of disposition 
21 See arguments for the ungrounded disposition in Mumford 2006; Molnar 2003,131-132. 
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ascriptions and thus evidence for the existence of dispositions. Though we 
seem to have both dispositional and non-dispositional predicates, and true 
sentences ascribing dispositional predicates to objects, one might argue that 
the fact that a predicate bears the marks of dispositionality doesn't show that 
the property it picks out is a disposition. It is thought that the dispositional 
concept, tied as it is to a causal role, is just an oblique way to referring to what 
is in fact a non-dispositional property. On such a view, when we are better 
acquainted with the occupant of this causal role, we can jettison the disposi-
tonal talk if we choose.22 So, while "magnetic" for example may bear the 
marks of dispositionality, if it picks out a property, on this view, it neverthe-
less picks out a non-dispositional property. Hence one can recognize both 
dispositional and non-dispositional predicates and yet deny the existence of 
dispositions. So, a full defense of dispositional pluralism should include an 
argument against anti-dispositionalism, if you want to call it that.23 
What about pandispositionalism - the view that all properties a~e disposi-
tions? Pandispositionalism is consistent with the view that there are different 
kinds of dispositions, so I need not rule out pandispositionalism in order to 
defend dispositional pluralism. However, property dualism (in this context, 
the view that there are both dispositional and non-dispositional properties) is 
more in the spirit of pluralism, and happens to be the view that I favor. But 
like the anti-dispositionalist, the pandispositionalist is unlikely to be con-
vinced by my semantic/ epistemic arguments. The pandispositionalist can 
acknowledge ascribable non-dispositional predicates, and yet maintain that all 
properties are dispositions. Such a theorist might point Out that bearing the 
marks of dispositionality is not necessary for a tenn to pick out a disposition. 
For example, one may point out that the tenn 'red,' as ordinarily understood, 
does not bear the marks of dispositionality: it has not strong conceptual asso-
ciation with triggering events, manifestations, or conditionals, nor is it nor-
mally thought of as equivalent in meaning to an overtly dispositional locution. 
Nevertheless, one might maintain that to be red is nevertheless·· to have a 
disposition to cause certain types of visual experiences. So, a defense of prop-
erty dualism cannot rest on the evidence for the truth of both disposition 
ascriptions and non-disposition ascriptions. Even when the truth of those 
ascriptions is not at issue, whether the predicates they employ refer to disposi-
tion is. 
Finding plausible examples of nondispositional properties is good reason 
to reject pandispositionalism. While the pandispositionalist might talk you 
22 Proponents of this "promissory note" conception of disposition tenus include Quine (1969,20) 
and Armstrong (1973, 15). 
23 I will not give that argument here, for lack of space and of anything new to say. For a defense of 
dispositions over Humean views, see for example, Molnar 2003, 111-121; Ellis 2002, 60-65; 
Mumford 1998, 170-191. 
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into thinking that shape and mass are dispositional,24 other properties seem 
immune to such strategies. Molnar makes a plausible argument for the view 
that spatio-temporal relations are irreducible, non-dispositional properties.25 
Also, arguably, we have evidence for non-dispositional qualities of our own 
experiences. Even if redness is a disposition to produce certain visual experi-
ences, some properties of those visual experiences seem non-dispositional. 
Whether or not one fInds such examples plausible, pandispositionalism is 
called into question by the so-called "always packing, never traveling" 
(APN1) objection.26 If all properties are dispositions, when objects manifest 
their dispositions, they merely acquire new dispositions. Each object packs 
and repacks its trunk full of properties, but it never takes off. 
One might not think that this regress is vicious. Instead, one might think 
a disposition to produce a disposition to produce a disposition is no worse 
than a cause whi€h produces an effect which is also a cause for a further ef-
fect, onward into the future. If there's anything to the objection, there must 
be an important difference between APNT and a simple causal chain. To 
make the objection clearer, we should take it beyond the metaphorical level. 
When an object manifests a disposition, some object acquires new prop-
erties, either the disposed object, some other object(s), or both: the elastic 
band takes on a new shape; the provocative cape changes the bull's mood; the 
soluble table dissolves and the surrounding liquid approaches saturation, etc. 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to grant that sometimes the manifestation 
of a disposition involves the acquisition of new dispositions. Dispositions to 
acquire dispositions are the second-order dispositions discussed by Broad, 
with magnetizability being a plausible example. But could it be the case that 
all dispositions are like that - merely dispositions for further dispositions? 
Could every manifestation of a disposition involve nothing more than the 
acquisition of new dispositions? Here's one way of formalizing APNT in an 
attempt to clarify just what's wrong with this picture: 
1. A manifestation of a disposition is constituted by a particular acquir-
ing some properties: If some particular, a, manifests a disposition, 
then some particular b acquires some properties. (possibly a = b, 
throughout.) 
2. If all properties are dispositions, and if a manifests a disposition, 
then some b acquires some dispositions (and does not acquire any 
non-dispositions) . 
3. A disposition is either manifest or latent (producing no manifesta-
tion). 
24 That's one interpretation of what's going on in Mellor (1974,171) and Goodman (1983, 41). 
25 Molnat 2003,159. 
26 This objection appears in many places. A nice discussion appears in Molnar 2002, 173-181. 
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4. If all properties are dispositions and b acquires some dispositions, 
then either b's new dispositions remain latent or some c acquires 
some dispositions. 
5. If all properties are dispositions and c acquires some dispositions, 
then either c's new dispositions remain latent or some d acquires 
some dispositions. 
6. If all properties are dispositions and d acquires some dispositions, 
then either· d's new dispositions remain latent or some e acquires 
some dispositions. 
7. etc. 
8. Therefore, if all properties are dispositions, every manifestation of a 
disposition is constituted by either 
a. a particular having a disposition that produces no manifesta-
tion,orby 
b. a particular having a disposition that gives something a dis-
position, which produces no manifestation, or by 
c. a particular having a disposition that gives something a dis--
position, which gives something a disposition, which has no 
manifestation, or by 
d. a particular having a disposition that gives something a dis-
position, which gives something a disposition, ad infinitum. 
9. It is not plausible that every manifestation of a disposition is consti-
tuted by a, b, c, or ... d. 
10. Not all properties are dispositions. 
The strength of this argument depends on premise 9. The disjunctions enu~ 
merated in premise 8 are supposed to bring out the sense in which nothing 
really happens in thepandispositionalist world. 
One response that's often made against the APNT argument is that it il-
legitimately assumes that dispositions are not fully real, and so that when 
something gains a disposition, nothing really happens. However, I acknowl-
edge that something gaining a disposition is an event, or something happen-
ing. However, I find it odd to suppose that all that ever happens is that 
things loose and acquire dispositions. 
Maybe what's wrong with the scenario described in premise 8 above is 
that it's not clear how one could ever observe a manifestation of a disposi-
tion. This thought inspires the following variation on the APNT argument: 
1. A disposition is either latent or manifest. 
2. If a disposition is latent, it is not observable. 
3. If a disposition is manifest, the disposition itself is at most indirecdy 
observable. 
4. Therefore, dispositions are never directly observable. 
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5. Therefore, if all properties are dispositions, no properties are direcdy 
observable. 
6. The only way to indicecdy observe a property is to direcdy observe 
some other property. 
7. Therefore, if all properties are dispositions, all properties are unob-
servable. 
8. Some properties are observable. 
9. Therefore, not all properties are dispositions. 
This argument relies on the contingent claim that some properties are observ-
able and perhaps the argument would not be sound in a world where observa-
tion is impossible. If one wants to oppose pandispositionalism in such a 
world, perhaps a dispositional account of "observable" could make it work. 
Never the less, the 8th premise above seems obviously true in the actual 
world, which is probably good enough to show that pandispositionalism is 
not true in the actual world. 
To summarize this section, one of the contrasting pair of absolutist posi-
tions concerning dispositions warrant further discussion, anti-dispositionalism 
(the view that no properties are dispositions) and pandispositionalism (the 
view that all properties are dispositions). I have argued that we have reasons 
to think that disposition claims are true, which gives us reason to think that 
dispositions exist. If the anti-dispositionalist remains unconvinced, my case 
needs to be supplemented with other arguments for the existence of disposi-
tions. While dispositional pluralism is consistent with pandispositionalism, 
property dualism (the view that both dispositional and non-dispositional 
properties exist) is more in line with the spirit of pluralism, and is a more 
plausible view in its own right. The APNT objection shows pandispositional-
ism to be an unattractive metaphysical picture. 
6. Conclusion 
Semantic and empirical evidence are consistent with there being different 
kinds of dispositions. Dispositions are a broad and heterogeneous kind of 
property. You may be interested in a certain kind of disposition - the natural, 
intrinsic, or fundamental. However, that focus should not be presented as an 
absolute claim that all dispositions are such and such. This may be a personal, 
linguistic preference on my part, but it is not an arbitrary preference. 
For one thing, dispositional pluralism is closer to ordinary English - both 
the term 'disposition,' its synonyms, and other recognizably dispositional 
predicates. I think it is better, other things being equal, to use terms in readily 
recognizable ways. Otherwise, one should clarify with a precising definition -
stipulating that this loose, umbrella term is going to be used in a more specific 
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way. Mentioning that you are using 'disposition' in the philosopher's and not 
the lay person's sense is insufficient.27 Even the "philosopher's sense" is quite 
pluralistic, as the philosophical distinctions at the outset show. 
A second, pragmatic issue is the usefulness of theorizing about disposi-
tions. Often, dispositional theorists try to generate interest in dispositions by 
pointing out how pervasive dispositional concepts are. This is false advertis-
ing if a scant minority of these concepts actually corresponds to . real disposi-
tions, on the theorists view. Many of the things theorists say about disposi-
tions can shed light on "so-called" dispositional theories of value, belief, 
colors, beauty, knowledge, fitness and others. Theorists would be prudent net 
to undercut the importance of their work by using the term "disposition" so 
narrowly that the concept is not relevant to these other philosophical con-
cerns. 
Thirdly, dispositional pluralism facilitates rather than restricts discussion 
among dispositional theorists. Often, those with sparse theories of disposi, 
tions express their willingness to yield to science the last word about funda-
mental properties. Therefore, on such views, whether any property, such as 
charge or mass, is a disposition, might be an unresolved scientific question. If 
so, we cannot confidently give any examples of genuine dispositions. Then 
we've traveled a long way from the useful concept that pervades our daily 
lives to one which we scarcely know how to apply. What are those things that 
we used to think of as dispositions? Are they non-dispositional properties, or 
nothing at all? How are we supposed to make sense of the ways we have been 
speaking? Speaking of numerous and various dispositions, and then consider-
ing, if we wish, whether any of these are ungrounded, extrinsic, derivative, or 
what have you, seems more helpful to metaphysical inquiry than starting off 
by stipulating away the existence of such dispositions. 
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